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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

I.

DID THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY
ENTERING A DEFAULT JUDGMENT THAT DID NOT INCLUDE
APPELLANT'S CHECK COLLECTION FEE?
A trial court's award of costs and the disallowance of a particular item as a

cost is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See Stevenett v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 977 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).
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iv

ARGUMENT
L

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY
ENTERING A DEFAULT JUDGMENT THAT DID NOT INCLUDE
APPELLANT'S CHECK COLLECTION FEE.
The Appellant's brief makes two primary arguments: (a) the Tholen case

established a definition of "all costs of collection" that is dispositive of this matter;
and (b) the District Court misread the plain language of the statute. Appellant's
arguments fail for three reasons: (a) the Tholen case said nothing about whether a
collection agency's collection fee is recoverable as "costs"; (b) the District Court
acted within its broad discretion and consistent with applicable Utah case law in
refusing to tax a collection fee as "costs"; and (c) the plain language of the Utah
Bad Check Law does not compel a trial court to award a check collection agency
its collection fee.
A.

The Case of Tholen v. Sandy City and Southridge Special
Improvement District is Not Dispositive of Any Issue in this Appeal.

Appellant argues that the case of Tholen v. Sandy City and Southridge
Special Improvement District, 849 P.2d 592, 596 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), is
dispositive of this matter. However, the issue in Tholen is entirely unrelated to the
issue before the Court in this appeal. The issue in Tholen was whether a statute
providing for recovery of costs allowed the prevailing party to recover attorney's
fees. See id. at 595. The Tholen Court concluded that, because the statue at issue
1
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in that case did not expressly provide for the recovery of attorney's fees, those fees
could not be recovered as "costs." See id. at 596. The issue in this case is whether
the statutory language allowing for recovery of "all costs of collection, including
all court costs and attorney's fees" required the District Court to award Appellant
its check collection fee. Not only is Tholen not dispositive of the issue in this
case, Tholen is not even relevant. The fact that the Court of Appeals in Tholen
distinguished "costs" from "attorney's fees" does not lead to the conclusion that
"costs" must, as a matter of law, include a check collection agency's collection
fees.
B.

The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Refusing to
Award Appellant a Check Collection Fee.

The only issue properly before this Court is whether the District Court erred
in refusing to tax as "costs" the expenses Appellant claims to have incurred as a
result of its collection efforts.1 Under well established Utah law, "the allowance
or disallowance of a particular item as a cost falls within the sound discretion of
1

Appellant is attempting to frame the issue before this Court as whether the
Judges of the District Court can lawfully adopt a uniform policy regarding the
interpretation of a statute. However, Appellant failed to raise in the District Court
the issue of the Judges' authority to adopt the January 10, 2000 memorandum as
official court policy. In fact, counsel for Appellant, when arguing before the
District Court, expressly acknowledged that "the policy is fair as far as it goes."
Hearing Transcript, Nov. 29, 2000 at 5. The issue of the policy's lawfulness has
therefore not been properly preserved for appeal. Whether or nor such a policy
was lawful, Judge Fratto made it very clear at the hearing that he considered
himself authorized to deviate from that policy. See id. at 4. Accordingly, the
District Court did not blindly adhere to the policy but merely, in its broad
discretion, disallowed a particular item as "costs." The decision is therefore
subject to review only as an abuse of discretion. See Stevenett v. Wal-Mart
Stores. Inc., 977 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).
2
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the trial court." Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 977 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah Ct.
App. 1999). See also Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah Ct. App.
1990).
What the Appellant seeks to recover as "costs" in this appeal are the
expenses it claims to have incurred as a result of its check collection efforts. Such
expenses are not taxable "costs" under Utah law. This Court, in Frampton v.
Wilson, discussed the
distinction to be understood between the legitimate and
taxable "costs" and other "expenses" of litigation
which may be ever so necessary but are not properly
taxable as costs.
605 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah 1980) (emphasis added). The fees Appellant seeks to
recover are more appropriately described not as taxable "costs," but rather as other
"expenses" Appellant has incurred. The District Court did not abuse its discretion
in refusing to tax Appellant's collection fees as costs in the default judgment
against Appellee.
In fact, the Amicus Curiae has found no Utah case law holding that such
expenses are appropriately taxable as costs, let alone case law mandating that such
expenses be so taxed. Rather, Utah case law suggests that those items properly
taxable as costs are "those fees which are required to be paid to the court and to
witnesses." Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah 1980. The Appellant's
collection fees are not "required to be paid to the court," nor are they payments to
witnesses. While Utah courts have allowed other expenses to be taxed as costs,

3
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such expenses have generally been limited to costs of depositions and related
expenses, and each claim for costs is evaluated on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g.,
Morgan, 795 P.2d at 687 (declining to tax accounting and appraisal fees as
"costs").
Utah courts have been reluctant to expand the range of expenses that may
be taxed as costs; that reluctance is consistent with this Court's charge that a trial
court "has a duty to guard against any excesses or abuses in the taxing" of costs.
Frampton, 605 P.2d at 774. A trial court cannot possibly guard against excesses or
abuses if it has no discretion to determine, in a particular case, what items may be
properly labeled as "costs." The District Court in this matter properly heeded this
Court's warning and did not abuse its discretion in disallowing Appellant's
collection fees as costs.
C.

Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-1 Does Not Compel a Trial Court to Award
Check Collection Fees in a Default Judgment.

Appellant's attempt to frame the issue before this Court as one of statutory
construction is flawed because it assumes the District Court decided more than it
actually did. The District Court did not rule that no "costs" other than court costs
could ever be recovered under the Bad Check Law. Rather, the District Court
merely held that the Appellant's collection expenses were not, in this particular
case, recoverable as "costs." In fact, the District Court gave Appellant the
opportunity to file, after a final ruling, an affidavit explaining how the collection

4
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expenses were incurred.2 See Hearing Transcript, Nov. 29, 2000 at 9. Appellant
never filed an affidavit and thus never articulated to the District Court any reason
why its expenses should be taxed as "costs." The District Court therefore had no
reason to find that Appellant's collection fees were anything more than
"expenses," and were thus unrecoverable.
Accordingly, the only ruling the District Court actually made concerning
the language of the Bad Check Law was, by implication, that the Bad Check Law
does not compel a trial court to award a collection agency's expenses as costs in a
default judgment. That holding is entirely accurate because the Bad Check Law
does not expressly provide that collection agency's fees are included in the
definition of "collection costs." The only items expressly included as "collection
costs" are court costs and attorney's fees, both of which Appellant was awarded.
See Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-1 (7)(b)(iii). The District Court's interpretation is also
consistent with the plain language of the statute which allows a trial court to
"waive all or part of the amounts owed under Subsections 7(b)(ii) through (iv)
upon a finding of good cause." Id. § 7-15-l(7)(c). Thus, even if a collection
agency's fees are recoverable as costs, a trial court has discretion to waive them
and is therefore not compelled to award those fees in a final judgment.

2

Appellant could also have submitted an affidavit setting forth the basis for its
claim for "costs" with its proposed judgment, but Appellant chose not to do so.
Appellant has not explained why it has never, despite an express invitation from
the District Court to do so, set forth in writing how its collection expenses are
calculated.
5
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Additionally, it would now be inconsistent for Appellants to argue that the
Bad Check law requires the trial court to award collection expenses in all cases,
regardless of whether the plaintiff has provided any evidence explaining how and
why those expenses were incurred. During the hearing regarding this matter
before the District Court, counsel for Appellant acknowledged that there have
been "some abuses with collection costs . .. [a]nd definitely those should be
stopped." Hearing Transcript, Nov. 29, 2000 at 10. A trial court cannot possibly
stop abuses with collection costs if it has no discretion under the Bad Check Law
to deny such expenses in appropriate cases.
Appellant argues that if "costs of collection" as used in the Utah Bad Check
Law does not include Appellant's $20.08 per check collection fee then a collection
agent "has lost his incentive to sue." Appellant's Brief at 17. That argument is
entirely without merit because the Bad Check Law allows for the recovery of (a)
the amount of the check, (b) interest, (c) court costs and attorney's fees, and (d)
damages equaling the greater of $100.00 per check or triple the check amount.
The "original payee" of the check is thus more than made whole even if it does not
receive a collection fee, and has ample additional funds from which to compensate
the check collection agency.
Moreover, there is nothing in the Bad Check Law to prevent an agent from
contracting with the "original payee" to received a fixed fee for its collection
efforts. The fact that the statute precludes an "original payee" from contracting
"for a person to retain any amounts charged or collected" as damages in no way
6
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prevents an "original payee" from simply contracting to pay the agent a fixed fee
for its services if a matter progresses to litigation. Thus, Appellant must simply
reevaluate the manner in which it secures payment for its services; it seems
doubtful that Appellant will lose all incentive to sue if its expenses are not taxable
as "costs."
Indeed, one can only presume that Appellant already has a system whereby
it is compensated in a manner that allows it some profit. During the hearing
before the District Court, Appellant's stated that the $20.08 collection fee is "only
[Appellant's] costs of collection. There's no profit involved, it's just - - it just
brings [Appellant] back to even." Hearing Transcript, Nov. 29, 2000 at 9.
Assuming Appellant is not a nonprofit corporation, Appellant must have some
arrangement with its customers that allows it to be a profitable enterprise.
Accordingly, even if the $20.08 per check charge only covers Appellant's "costs,"
there is no reason why Appellant cannot amend its contractual arrangements to
ensure that its costs and profit are paid.

7
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Amicus Curiae respectfully submit that
the District Court did not abuse its discretion by entering a default judgment that
did not include Appellant's check collection fee.
DATED this J 0 _ day of August, 2001.

VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

David A. Greenwood
Evan S. Strassbgrg
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